Research

Working Papers

  • Strategic Campaign Communication in Single-vs. Two-Round Elections: Evidence from Candidate Manifestos in Brazilian Municipalities (with Marcos Nakaguma) [Working Paper]
    Abstract

    This paper examines how candidates adjust their campaign rhetoric when competing in single-versus two-round elections. Building on the canonical Hotelling-Downs framework, we first develop a simple model with three candidates. Our theoretical analysis shows that, while single-round plurality elections generate incentives for platform polarization, tworound systems give rise to a centripetal force that induces candidates to converge toward the median voter when repositioning between rounds is sufficiently costly. To test this prediction, we assemble a novel dataset of more than 54,000 candidate manifestos from Brazilian mayoral elections between 2012 and 2024 and use supervised text analysis to construct an ideological score for each document. Our empirical strategy exploits a regression discontinuity design based on the constitutional rule that assigns two-round elections to municipalities with more than 200,000 registered voters. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that candidates facing the possibility of a runoff produce significantly less polarized manifestos and choose platforms closer to those of their competitors. These effects are concentrated among candidates with weaker electoral prospects: contestants predicted to finish third respond to the possibility of a runoff by moderating their rhetoric from the outset, while those expected to finish first or second remain largely unaffected.

Book Chapters